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Introduction 
'  -
1.  _  On  1 December 1997,  following· a  wide-ranging. discussion  on  the  need  for 
coordinated action at  Community  level  to  tackle  hannful  tax  competition,  the 
Council (ECOFIN) adopted a series of conclusions and. agreed a resolution on a 
code of conduct for business taxation (hereinafter "code of conduct")'. On that 
occasion, the Commission undertook to draw up guidelines on the application of 
·. Articles 92 and 93  of the Treaty to measures relating to  direct busii1ess  taxation 
and committed itself "to the  strict application of the  ~id rules concerned".  The 
code of  conduct aims to improve transparency in the tax area through a system of 
information  exchanges  between  Member States ·and  of assessment  of any  tax 
measures that may be covered by it. For their part, the State aid provisions of  the . 
Treaty  will  also  contribute  through their  own  mechanism  to  the  objective of 
tackling hannful tax competition. · 
··  2.  ·  The Commission's undertaking regarding State aid in the form of tax measures 
forms part of the wider objective of clarifying and reinforcing the application of 
the  State aid  rules  in order to  reduce  distortions  of competition ,in  the  single 
market  The  principle  of incompatibility  with  the  common  market  and  the 
derogations from that principle apply to aid "in any form whatsoever", including 
certain  tax  measures.  However,  the  question  whether  a  tax· measure  can  be 
qualified as aid under Article 92(1) of the Treaty calls for clarification which this 
notice proposes to provide. Such clarification is particularly important in view of 
. the ·proceditral  requirements  that  stem  from  designation  as  aid  and  of the 
consequences where Member· States fail to comply With' such requirements. 
3.  Following the completion of the single market and  the  liberalisation of capital 
movements,  it has  also  become apparent  that there  is a need  to  examine  the 
particular effects of aid granted in the forni of tax measures and to spell out the 
consequences as  regards assessment of the aid's compatibility with the common 
. market2•  The  establishment  of economic  and.  monetary  union  and  the 
consolidation of  national budgets which it entails will make it even more essential 
to have strict control ofState·aid in whatever form it may take. Similarly, account 
must also  be  taken,  in the  common interest,. of the  major repercussions' which 
some. aid  g~anted through. tax  systems  may  have  on  the.  revenue  of other 
Member States. 
I  ·  OJ C 2, 6.1.1998, p.  I. 
2  See Action Plan for the Single, Market, CSE(97)1, 4 June  1997, Strategic Target 2, Action l. 4.  In addition to the objective of  ensuring ~~t  Commission decisions are transparent 
and  predictable,  this- notice  also ·aims  to  ensure  consistency  and  equality  of 
treatment  between  Memb~r  States.  The  Commission .intends,  as  the  code  of 
conduct notes, to. examine or re-examine case by case, on the basis of th.is notice, 
the tax arrangements in force in the Member States. 
A.  Community powers of action 
5.  The Treaty empowers the Community to take measures to eliminate various-types 
of distortion that harm the proper functioning Of the common market It is thus 
essential to distinguish between the different types of  distortion. .  · 
6.  Some general tax measures may  imped_e  the proper functioning of the  internal 
market. In the case of  such measures, the Treaty provides, on the one hand, for the 
possibility  of  harmonising  Member States'  tax  provisions  on  the  basis  of 
Article 100  (Council  directives,  adopted.  unanimously).  On  the . other,  some 
disparities between planned or existing general provisions in Member States may 
distort competition and create distortions that need to be eliminated on the basis . 
of Articles 101  and  102  (consultation  of the  relevant  Member States  by  the 
Commission; if  necessary, Council ciirectives adopted by a qualified majority). 
7.  The distortions of  competition deriving from State aid fall under.a system of  prior. 
Commission  authorisation,  subject  to  review  by  the  Community  judicature. 
· Pursuant to Article 93(3), State aid measures must be notified to the Com·mission. 
Member States  may  not put their  proposed  aid  measures ..into  effect until  the 
Commission has approved them. The Commission examines the compatibility of 
aid not in terms of the fortn which it .may take, but in terms of its effect. It may 
decide that the Member State must amend or abolish aid which the Commission 
finds to  be incompatible with the common market.  Where aid has· already been 
implemented  in  breach  of the  procedural  rules,  the  Member State  must  m 
principle recover it from the recipient(s)~  .  , 
B.  Application of  Ar~icle 92(1) of the EC.  Treaty to tax measures 
8.  Article 92(1)  states  that "any aid  granted  by a  Member State  or through  State 
resources  in  any  form  whatsoever  which  distorts  or  threatens  to  distort 
competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods 
shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with 
the.  common  market".  In  applying  the  Community  rules .  on  State  aid~  it  is 
irrelevant whether the measure is  a tax measure, since Article 92 applies to  aid 
measures  "in any  form  whatsoever".  :ro be  termed  aid,  within the  meaning of 
Article 92, a measure must meet the cumulative criteria d~scribed below, 
_,  ~  . 
2 9.  Firstly, the measure must confer on recipients an advantage which relieves them 
of charges that are  normally borne  from  ~heir budgets.  The advantage may be 










a reduction in the tax base (such as  speciiil deductions, special or accelerated 
depreciation arrangements or the entering of  reserves on the ~alance sheet); 
a total or partial reduction in the amount oftax (such as  exemption or a tax 
credit); 
- deferment, cancellation or even special rescheduling of  tax debt. 
Secondly, the advantage must be granted by the State or through state resources. 
A loss of tax revenue is equivalent to consumption of state resources in the form  · 
of  fiscal expenditure. This criterion also applies to aid granted by regional or local 
bodies in the Memoer StatesJ. Furthermore, state support may be provided just as 
. much through tax provisions of a legislative, regulatory or administrative nature 
· as through the practices of  the tax authorities. 
Thirdly, the measure must affect competition and trade between Member States. 
This  criterion  presupposes  that  the  beneficiary  of ·the  measure  exercises  an 
economic  activity,  regardless  of the  beneficiary's  legal  status  pr  means  of 
financing. Under settled case-law, for the purposes ofthis provision, the criterion 
of  trade being affected is :met if the recipient firm carries on an economic activity 
involving trade be.tween  Member States.  The mere  fact that the  aid strengthens 
the firm's position compared with that of other firms  which are competitors ·in 
intra-Community  trade ·is  enough  to' allow  the  conclusion  to  be  drawn  that 
intra-Community trade is affected. Neither the fact that aid is· relatively small in 
amount4, nor the. fact  th(lt  the  recipient  is  moderate  in  size  or its  share of the 
Community market very smalls,  nor  indeed the fact  that the recipient does not 
carry outexports6 or exports virtually all its production outside the Community? 
. do anything toalter this conclusion.  '  .  .  . 
Lastly,  the  measure  must  be  specific  or  selective  in  that  it  favours  "certain 
undertakings  or  the  production  of certain  goods".  The  selective  advantage 
involved here may derive from an. exception to the tax provisions of a legislative, 
regulatory or administrative nature or from a discretionary practice on the part of 
the tax authorities. However, the selective nature of  a measure may be justified by 
"the nature or general scheme ofthe system"&. If  so, the measure is not considered 
to beaid within the meaning of Article 92(l)Ofthe Treaty. These various aspects 
. are lo_oked at below.  .  .  . .  .  .  .  . 
Judgment of  the Court of Justice in Case 248/84 Germany v Commission [1987) ECR 4013. 
With  the  exception,  however,  of  aid  .  meeting  the  tests  of  the  "de minimis"  'rule.  See  the 
Commission notice published in OJ C 68; 6.3. 1996, p. 9. 
Joined Cases C-278/92, C-279/92 and C-280/92 Spain v Commission [1994] ECR 1-4103. 
Case 102/87 France v Commission [1988] ECR4067. 
Case C-142/87 Belgium v Commission (1990] ECR I-959. 
Case 113173/ta/y v Commission [1974] ECR 709. 
3  .. Distinction between State aid and general measures 
13.  Tax  measures  which  are  open  to  all  economic  agents  operating  ,within  a 
Member State are in principle general measures. They must be  effectiv~ly open to 
all firms on an equal access basis, and they may not de facto be reduced in scope 
through,  for  ~xample, the  discretionary  power  of the  State  to  grant  them  or 
through .other factors  that restrict their practical effect:  However, this condition 
does not restrict the  power of Member States to  decide on the economic policy 
which they consider most appropriate and, in particular, to spread the tax burden 
as they see fit across the different factors of producti
1on. Provided that they apply 
without distinction to all  firms and to  the production of all goods, the following 
measures do not constitute State aid:  ·  '  · 
tax  measures  of a  purely  techniCal  nature  (for  example,  setting ·the  rate  of 
taxation, depreciation rules and rules on loss carry-overs; provisions to prevent 
double taxation or tax avoidance); 
measures pursuing general economic policy objectives through a reduction of 
the  tax  burden  related  to  certain  production  costs  (research  and 
development (R&D), the environment, training, employment). 
14. ·  The fact that some firms or some sectors benefit more than others from some of 
thesS!  tax  measures  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  they  are  caught  by  the 
competition rules  governing  State aid.  Thus, measures designed  to Teduce  the 
taxation of labour for all firms have a relatively greater effect on labour.:.intensive 
industries  than  on  capital-intensive  industries,  without  necessarily  constituting 
State aid. Similarly, tax incentives for  envi~onmental, R&D or training iiwestment 
·favour  OQly  the  firms  which  undertake  such  investment,  but  again  do  not 
necessarily constitute State aid. 
15.  In  a judgment delivered  in  1974'9,  the  Court of Justice  held  that  any  measure 
intended  partially ·or wholly  to  exempt  firms  in  'l- particular· sector  from  the 
. charges arising from the normal application of the general system "without there 
being any justification for this exemption on  the  basis of  the  nature  or general 
. scheme  of this  system"  constituted  State  aid.  The  judgment  also  states ·that 
"Article 92  does  not  distingzdsh  between  the  measures  of State  intervention 
concerned by reference to  their causes  or aims but defines  them  tn relation  to 
their effects".  The judgment also points out that the fact that the measure brings 
charges in the relevant sector more into line with those of its competitors in other 
Member States does not alter the fact that it is aid. Such divergences between tax 
systems - which,  as  rointed  out  above,  are  covered  by  Articles 100 
to  102 : carmot be corrected by unilateral measures that target the firms which are. 
most affected by the disparities between tax systems. 
9  See note 8. 
4 ' 
16.  The main criterion in applying Article92(1) to a tax measure is therefore that the 
measure  provides  in favour  of certain  undertakings  in  the  Member State  an · 
exception to ·the application. of the tax system.  The common system applicable 
should thus first be determined. It must then be examined whether the exception 
to the system or differentiations within that system are justified "by the nature or 
general  scheme"  of the tax  system,  that  is  to  say,  whether they derive directly 
from ·the  basic ·or  guiding  principles  of  the tax  system  in  the  Member State 
concerned. Ifthis is not the case, then State aid is involved  . 
.  The selectivity or specificity criterion 
17.  The Commission
1s  deCision-making  practice  so  far  shows  that  only measures 
whose  scope  extends to  the  entire ·territory.  ~f the  State  escape the  specificity 
criterion laid  down  in  Article 92(1).  Measures  which  are  regional or  local  in 
scope  may  favour  certain  undenakings,  subject. to  th~ principles  outlined  in 
paragraph 16.  The Tt:eaty  itself qualifies as  aid measures which are. intended to 
promote the economic development of  (l region. Article 92(3)(a) and (c)-explicitly 
provides, in the case of  this type of aid, for possible derogations from the general 
principle of  incompatibility laid down in Article 92( 1).  · 
. l8.  . The Treaty clearly provides that a measure which is sectorally specific is caught 
by Article 92(1).  Article 92(1) expressly includes the phrase 
11the production o( 
certain goods
11  amongst the criteria determining whether there i's aid that is subject 
to Commission monitoring. According to  ~ell-established practice and case law, 
a tax measure whose main effect is  to  promote one or more sectors of activity . 
.  constitutes aid. The same applies to a measure that favours only  national products 
·which are.  ~xportediO. Furthermore,  the  Commission has. taken the view that  a 
measure  which  targets  all  of the  sectors  that  are  subject  to  international 
competition constitutes aidll. A derogation from  the base rate of corporation tax 
for  an  entire  section of the  economy  therefore  constitutes,  except for certain 
cases12, State aid, as the Commission decided for a measure concerning the whole 
·of  the ·manufacturing sectorl3. .  ·  · 
19.  In several Member States, different tax rules apply depending on the status of the 
undertakings.  Some -public  undertakings,  for  example,  arc  exempt  from  local 
taxes or from company taxes. Such rules, which accord preferential treatment to 
undertakings having the legal  status  of public  undertaking  and  ca-rrying out an 
economic activity, may constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 92 of 
the Treaty. 
10  Joined Cases 6 and. 11/69 Commission v France [ 1969] ECR 523. 
11  Commission  Decision  97/239/EC  of 4 December 1996  ir:J  the  "Maribel  bis/ter"  case, .  OJ  L 95, 
I 0.4.1997, p. 25 (currently subjudice,Case C-75/97). 
12  In particular,· agriculture and fisheries, see paragraph 27. 
13  Commission  Decision of 22 July 1998  in the :·Irish  Corporation Tax" case (SG(98)D/7209) not yet 
published.  · 
5 20.  Some tax benefits are on occasion restricted to  certain types of undertaking, to 
some of their functions (intra-group services, intermediation or· coordination) or . 
to the production of  certain goods. In so far as they favour ceitain.undertakings or 
the production of certain goods, they  may constitute  Stat~ aid as· refei:red ,to in 
Article 92(1).  ·  · 
Discretionary administrative practices 
21.  The discretionary practices ·of some tax authorities may also give rise to measures 
that are  caught by Article 92.  The Court of Justice acknowledges  that treating 
economic  agents  on  a  discretionary  basis  may  mean  that · the  individual 
application of a general measure takes on the features of a selective measure, In 
particular where  exercise  of the  discretionary  power  goes  beyond· the  simple 
management of  tax revenue by reference to objective criteria14• 
22.  If in daily practice tax rules need to be interpreted, they cannot leave room for a 
discretionary treatment of  undertakings. Every decision of the administration that 
departs  from  the  general  tax rules  to  the  benefit of individual  undertakings in 
principle leads to a presumption of  State aid·and must be analysed in detail. As far 
as administrative rulings merely contain an interpretation of  general rules, they do 
not give rise to a presumption of  aid. However, the opacity of the decisions taken 
by  the  authorities  and the  room  for  manoeuvre  which  they  sometimes  enjoy 
support the presumption that such is  at any  rate· their effect in some instances. 
This does not make Member States any less able to provide their taxpayers with 
. legal certainty and predictability on the application of  general tax rules. 
Justification of  a derogation by "the nature or general scheme of  the system" 
23.  The differential  nature of some. measures  does  not  necessarily, mean that they 
must ·be  considered· to  be  State  aid.  This  is  the  case ·with  measures  whose 
economic rationale makes them necessary to the functioning and effectiveness of· 
the  tax  system's.  However,  it  is  up  to  the  MemberState  to  provide  such 
justification  .. 
24.  The progressive nature of an income tax scale or profit tax scale is justified by the 
redistributive  purpose  of the  tax.  Calculation  of asset  depreciation' arid  stock 
valuation methods vary from one Member State to another, but such methods may 
be  inherent  in  the  tax  systems  to  which  they  belong.  In  the  same  way,  the 
arrangements for the collection of fiscal debts can differ from one Member State 
to  th~ other.  Lastly, some conditions  may  be justified by objective differences 
between taxpayers. However, if the tax authority has discretionary freedom to set 
different depreciation periods or different valuation methods, firm by firm,  sector 
by sector, there is a presumption of aid.  Such a presumption also exists ~heri the 
fiscal administration. handles fiscal debts on a case by case basis with an objective 
different  from  the  objective of optimising  the  recovery  of tax  debts  from  the 
enterprise concerned. 
14  Case C-241/94 France v Commission (Kimberly Clark Sopalin) [ 1996] ECR 1-4551. 
t5  Commission Decision 96/369/EC of 13 March 1996 concerning fiscal aid given lo German·air.Jines in 
the form of  a depreciation facility, OJ L 146, 20.6.1996, p. 42.  '  ·  ·  ·  · 
6 25.  . Obviously,  profit  tax  cannot be  levied  if no  profit is  earned.  It may  thus  be 
justified by the  nature  of the  tax .  system  that  n(:m-profit~making undertakings; 
such as foundations  or associations, are  specifically exempt from  _the  taxes  on 
profits  if they  cannot  actually  earn any  profits.  Furthermore,  it  may  also  be 
justified by the nature of the tax system that cooperatives which distribute all their 
. profits to their members are not taxed at the level ofthe cooperative when tax is 
levied at the.level of  their members. 
26.  A distinction must be  made  between,  on the  one hand,  the external  objectives 
assigned to a particular  ~ax scheme (in particular, social or regional objectives) 
and, on the other, the objectives_ which are inherent in the tax system itself. The 
whole purpose of  the tax system is to collect revenue to finance state expenditure. 
Each firm is supposed to pay tax once only. It is therefore inherent in ·the logic of · · 
the tax system that taxes paid in the  State in which the firm  is  resident for  tax 
purposes should be  taken into account.  Certain exceptions to  the  tax rules are, 
. however, difficult to justify by the logic of a tax system. This is, for example, the 
case if  non~resident companies are treated more favourably than resident ones or 
if tax benefits are granted to  head offices or to  firms  providing certain services 
(for example, financial services) within a group. 
27.  Specific  provisions  that  do  not  contain  discretionary  elements,  allowing  for 
example tax to be determined on a fixed basis (for exarpple, in the agriculture or 
fisheries sectors), may be justified by the nature and general scheme of  the system 
where, for example, they take account of specific accounting requirements or of 
the  importance  of land.  in  assets  which  are  specific  to  certain  sectors;  such 
provisions  do  not  th~refore constitute  State  aid.  Lastly,  the  logic  underlying 
'  certain specific.provisions on the taxation of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(including small agricultural enterprises1 6)  is  comparable to that underlying the 
progressiveness of  a tax scale.· 
C.  Compatibility with  the common  market of  ~tate aid  in  the  form  of tax 
.. measures 
28.  . If  a tax measure constitutes aid that is caught by Article 92(1), it can nevertheless, 
like  aid  granted  in  other forms,  qualify  for  one  of the  derogations  from  the 
principle  of  incompatibility  with  the  commort  market  provided  for  in 
Article 92(2) and  (3).  Furthermore,  where  !he recipient - whether  a  private  or 
· public undertaking - has been entrusted by the State with the operation of services-
of general  economic  interest,  the  aid  may  also  qualify  for  application  of the 
.  provisions of  Article 90 of  the Treaty17. 
16  Operators jn the agricultural sector with no more than  I 0 annual work units. 
17  Judgment of the Court of First  Instance  in:  Case T-106/95  FFSA  and others v  Commission  [1997] 
ECR II~229. Order of  the Court of  Justice in Case C-174/97 P [ 1998]1-1303. 
.  .7  ' 29.  The Commission could not,  ho~ever, authorise aid whi~h,.proved to.be in brea~h 
both of  the rules laid down in the Treaty, particularly tho~e relating  to the ban on 
discrimination  and  to  the  right  of establishment,  and  of· the  provisions· of 
secondary law on taxation•s,  Such aspects  may,  1n  parallel,  b~ the  object of a 
. separate procedure on the basis of Article  169. As  is  clear from  case-law, those 
aspects of  .aid  which are indissolubly linked to  the  object of the aid  ~nd which 
contravene specific provisions of the Treaty other than Articles 92 and 93  must 
however be examined in the light of the procedure under Article 93  as·part.Qf an 
overall examination of  the compatibility or the incompatibility of  the ,aid. 
30.  The qualification of a tax measure as harmful under the code of conduct does not 
affect its  possible qualification as  a  State aid.  However  the  assessment 9f the 
compatibility of fiscal aid with the common 'market will have 'to be made, taking 
into  account,  inter alia,  the  effects  of aid  that  are  brought  to  light  in  the 
application of  the code of  conduct.. 
31.  Where a fiscal aid is granted in order to provide an incentive for firnis to embark 
on certain specific projects (investment in particular)  and  where  its illtensity is 
limited with respect to the costs of  carrying out the project, it is no different frpm 
a  subsidy  and  may  be  accorded  the  same  treatment. . Nevertheless,  'such 
. arrangements must lay down. sufficiently transparent rules to enable the benefit 
conferred to be quap.tified.  · 
32.  In most cases, however, tax relief provisions are  general in nature: they are not 
linked  to  the  carrying-out  of specific  projects  and  reduce  a  firm;s  current 
expenditure without it being possible to assess the precise volume involv$!d when 
the  Commission carries  out its  ex ante  examination.  Such measures  constitute 
"operating  aid".  Operating  aid  is  in  principle  prohibited.  The  Commission 
authorises it at present only in exceptional cases and subject to certain conditions, 
for example in shipbuilding, certain types of  environmental protection aidl9 and.in 
regions,  including  ultra-peripheral  regions,  covered  by  the  Article 92(3)(a)  aid 
derogation provided that they are duly justified .and their level is proportional to 
the handicaps they are intended to offset20. It must in principle (with the·exception 
of the two categories of aid mantioned below) be degressive and limited in time. 
At present, operating aid can also be authorised in the form of transport aid  in 
ultra-peripheral regions and in certain Nordic regions that are sparsely populated 
and are seriously handicapped in terms of accessibility. Operating aid may not be 
authorised  where  it  represents  aid  for  exports  between  Member States.  As  for 
State aid  in  favour of the maritime transport  sector  the  specific. rules  for  that 
sector apply2I. 
18  Case  74/76  Iannelli  v  Meroni  (1977]  ECR  557.  See  also  Cases  73/79  "Sovraprczzo"  [1980] 
ECR 1533,  T-49/93  "SIDE"  [1995]  ECR  11-2501  and  Joined  Cases  C 142,  and  ..  143/80 
"Salengo" [1981) ECR 1413. 
19  Community guidelines on State aid for environmental protection, OJ C  -72  I 0.3.1994, p. 3. 
20  Guidelines on national regional aid, OJ C 74,  I  0.3.1998, p. 9. 
21  Community guidelines on State aid to maritime transport, OJ C 205, 5.7.1997, .p. 5. 
8 33.  If it is to be considered by the  Commi~sion to be compatible with the common 
·market, State aid  intended to promote the economic development of particular 
areas  must  be  "in  proportion  to, and targeted  at,  the  aims  sought".  For  the 
examination  of regional  aid  the  criteria  allow  account  to  be · taken  of other 
possible effects, in particular of certain effects brought to  light  by the  code of 
conduct.  Where  a  derogation  is  granted  on  the  basis  of regional  criteria,  the 
Commission must ensure in particular that the relevant measures: 
contribute  to  regional  development  and  relate  to  activities  having  a  local 
impact.  The establishment of off-shore activities does  not, to  the extent that 
their externalities on the local economy are low, normally provide·satisfactory 
support for the local economy; 
relate to real regional handicaps. It is open to question whether there are any 
real regional handicaps for activities for which the additional costs have little 
incidence,  such  as  for  example  the. transport  costs  for  financing  activities, 
which lend themselves to tax avoidance; 
are examined in a Community context22. The Commission must in this respect 
· take account of anynegative effects which  such measures may have·on other 
Member States.  · 
D.  Procedures 
34.  Article 93(3) requires Member States to notify the Commission of  all their "plans 
to grantor alter aid" and provides that any proposed measures may not be put into 
effect without the Commission's prior approval. This procedure applies to all aid,· 
including tax aid. 
35.  If  the Commission finds that State aid which has been put into effect in breach of 
this rule does not qualify for any of  the exemptions provided· for in the Treaty and 
istherefore incompatible with the common market, it requires the Member State. 
to  recover  it,  except  where  that  would .  be  contrary  to  a  general  principle  of 
Community law, in particular legitimate expectations to which the Commission's 
behaviour can give rise. In the  c~se of State aid in the form of tax measures, the 
amount to  be covered is calculated on the basis of a comparison between the tax 
actually  paid  and  the  amount  which  should  have  been paid  if the  generally 
applicable  rule  had  been  applied.  Interest  is  added  to  this  basic  amount.  The 
interest rate to be applied is equivalent to the reference rate used to calculate the 
grant equivale~t of  regional aid. .  ' 
36.  Article 93(1)  states  that  the  Commission  "shall  in  ·cooperation  with 
Member States, keep under constant review all systems of aid existing in those 
States". Such review extends to  State aid in the form  of tax measures. So  as  to 
allow such review to be carried out; the Member States are required to  submit to 
the. Commission every year reports on their existing State aid systems. In the case · 
of tax relief  or full or partial tax exemption,. the reports must provide an estimate 
of budgetary  revenue  lost.  Following  its  review,  the  Commission  may,  if it  . 
22  Case 730179 Philip Morris v Commission [ 1980] ECR 2671. 
9 considers that the  scheme is  not or is  no  longer compatible  with the common 
market, propose that the Member State amend or abolish it. 
E.  Implementation 
37.  The Commission will, on the basis of the guidelines set out in this notice and as 
from the time of  its publication, examine the plans for tax aid notified to it  and tax 
aid illegally implemented in the Member States and will review existing systems. 
This  notice  is  published  for  guidance  purposes  and  is  not  exhaustive.  The 
Commission will take account of  all the specific circumstances· in each individual. 
case. 
38.  The  Commission will  review the  application  of this  notice  two years  after  its 
publication. 
10 